Firms increasingly break up their production across different regions and countries. Despite the growing prevalence of these global production chains, there is little empirical evidence about their determinants. I exploit new detailed data to assess the relative importance of some key determinants of whether firms contract for manufacturing services from domestic or foreign suppliers. The data provide a rich and novel set of stylized facts that, among other things, show substantial within industry heterogeneity in firms' organization of production. I develop a model that is consistent with this heterogeneity and use it to derive additional predictions. The findings support a number of the model's predictions, namely firms are more likely to break up production when (i) there are large labor cost savings; (ii) industry transport costs are lower; (iii) firms have technology likely to reduce coordination costs; and (iv) the "parent" firm is more productive. JEL Codes: L23,F1,F12,F2
Introduction
It has become increasingly common for firms to perform different stages of their production process in separate, distinct locations. One dimension of this production fragmentation, offshoring, occurs when a firm relocates part or all of its production process overseas. With its potential to affect domestic employment and change global production patterns, offshoring has been the subject of lively debate in both the economic literature and popular press. Blinder and Krueger (2009) estimate that 24-25% of U.S. jobs are potentially offshorable and the Obama administration has threatened to penalize U.S. firms that offshore jobs. In contrast, Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) posit that offshoring entails productivity gains that may boost domestic employment, and businesses argue that global production chains form an integral part of their competitiveness in the world economy.
Although offshoring has received ample attention, domestic fragmentation of production has been largely ignored. Despite this neglect, domestic manufacturing fragmentation is far more common than offshoring and represents an important margin in the reorganization of U.S. production. Whether fragmentation takes place domestically or abroad, it entails a fundamental change in the production process. According to the Office of Management and Budget, "When producers subcontract portions of the production process to separate affiliated or unaffiliated units, the production function changes at the establishment level" (OMB (2009), p. 766). In addition, domestic fragmentation is driven by the same cost reduction goals as offshoring. Firms may fragment production to enjoy returns to specialization or to exploit labor cost differences across locations, and these motives can apply to both foreign and domestic sourcing locations. Including the domestic margin is therefore necessary to garner a complete picture of firms' global production chains. 1 Recent technological improvements in information technology are credited with enabling firms' relocation of production across locations. According to Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) , "Revolutionary advances in transportation and communications technology have weakened the link between labor specialization and geographic concentration, making it easier to separate tasks in time and space" (p. 1978) . In more recent work, Baldwin and Venables (2010) attribute fragmentation of production to " ...revolutionary advances in information and communications technology (ICT) that massively lowered the cost of organising complex activities over distances" (p. 1). Despite the common wisdom, there is little empirical evidence on the relationship between information technology and production fragmentation. In fact, the paucity of comprehensive data on how firms organize their physical production process has resulted in a substantial gap in our knowledge of which firms actually fragment their production and why they choose to do so. We have no clear sense of the relative magnitudes of the costs and benefits fragmentation entails, or of how these costs and benefits vary across firms, industries and locations. This paper presents a theoretical framework based on new micro-level data of firms' sourcing decisions. I use the data to uncover novel facts about firms' production fragmentation decisions. I develop a model that captures these stylized facts and delivers predictions about the determinants of firms' sourcing choices. Additional empirical analyses support the model and provide estimates of the relative elasticities of firms' domestic and offshore sourcing decisions with respect to the various costs and benefits fragmentation entails.
The data are from a new question in the 2007 Census of Manufactures and Census of Wholesale. The question asks whether an establishment purchased contract manufacturing services from other establishments (within its company or from another company) to process its inputs; and if so, whether it primarily purchased these services domestically or abroad.
Combining these data with additional census variables, merging them with information from the Longitudinal Database (LBD), 2 and linking them to firm-level imports, I construct a rich new dataset that yields a number of stylized facts about plants that fragment production. 3 First, the data show that despite the increase in its prevalence, the majority of plants do not fragment their production across locations. The data also highlight the importance of the domestic fragmentation margin. The shares of wholesale and manufacturing plants that fragment production domestically are 3 and 13 times higher respectively than the shares of plants that offshore. These basic production sourcing patterns hold within most six digit NAICS industries. Although every industry has a positive share of plants that purchase contract manufacturing services, there is substantial non-participation within industries.
In addition, the share of establishments that purchase contract manufacturing services domestically is higher than the share of plants that offshore in all manufacturing industries and in 88% of the wholesale industries. Finally, the data show that plants that fragment production are larger and more productive; and of the plants that fragment production, those that do so offshore are the largest and most productive.
These new stylized facts lead me to develop a model of heterogeneous firms who must decide where to produce the inputs required to make their final good. Fragmenting production allows final good producers to realize two distinct cost savings. First, they can purchase inputs from specialized suppliers. Each manufacturing service provider (MSP) specializes in the production of one input that it can customize for multiple final good producers. 4 As a result, MSPs enjoy lower production costs which they pass on to final good producers.
Second, final good producers can purchase inputs from MSPs in different locations, both domestic and foreign, in which labor costs are lower.
While fragmentation allows final good producers to purchase inputs more cheaply, breaking apart the production process also entails certain costs. In particular, final good producers incur a fixed cost of establishing a relationship with an MSP, and this fixed cost is higher for foreign fragmentation. These fixed costs mean that only final good producers with productivity above a certain threshold will find it profitable to fragment production; and of the fragmenting establishments, only the most productive will do so offshore. Production fragmentation also involves marginal costs because final good producers must coordinate the production process across multiple locations. Coordination is costly and depends upon adequate communication networks across locations. Inputs must often be transported across locations so that physical transportation costs play an important role in the cost function as well.
Firms' motives for fragmentation in the model are similar to the offshoring incentives in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) and Rodríguez-Clare (2010) where offshoring allows for labor cost savings. The gain from specialization is similar to Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2009) , although that model assumes external economies of scale, while returns to specialization are internal to MSPs in this model. The main difference from earlier models though, is that here the fragmentation motives exist for both foreign and domestic sourcing decisions. As a result, fragmentation costs depend not only on task-specific characteristics, as in the GRH papers, but also on firms' sourcing locations. I exploit the task and locationspecific dimensions to develop a richer cost structure with specific predictions I can test empirically.
This paper also differs from the Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg papers because the costs and benefits from fragmenting production vary across producers. Whereas all producers in those papers offshore the same share of production, this model includes heterogeneous firms with different sourcing strategies. In this dimension, the model is similar to Antràs and Helpman (2004) where firm productivity differences combine with fixed costs to yield Melitz (2003) sorting. The focus of AH 2004, however, is on whether a final good producer should own its input supplier. In contrast, this paper ignores the ownership decision and focuses on when different stages of production should take place in distinct physical locations. AH 2004 also predict that a firm's decision to offshore input production is solely determined by its productivity. While this paper includes a role for productivity, coordination and transportation costs are also critical determinants of the offshoring decision.
The model delivers a number of predictions about which final good producers will fragment production, the location of their fragmented production, and their degree of fragmentation.
The fixed costs from fragmentation mean that producers' sourcing decisions depend upon their productivities. Because marginal costs of fragmentation are increasing in communication costs, producers with better information technology should have lower communication costs and will therefore be more likely to fragment production. Since fragmentation often entails transporting physical output, producers will choose the closest viable sourcing location, holding other factors constant. Finally, the motive to procure cheaper labor implies that producers in high wage locations will have more to gain from fragmenting production. Consistent with the model, the probability that a plant fragments production is increasing in its productivity. The probability of fragmentation is also higher for establishments located in high wage states; supporting the premise that access to lower labor costs is an important determinant of fragmentation. I use heterogeneity in establishments' use of electronic networks to coordinate their flow of shipments to assess the importance of information technology in coordinating production across locations. As expected, I find that manufacturing establishments that use electronic networks have a higher probability of fragmenting their production. I also estimate the probability that an establishment that fragments its production will choose to do so offshore. Conditional on fragmenting, the most productive establishments offshore production. In addition, establishments that border Mexico or a coastline are more likely to offshore. This result is consistent with the model's prediction that transportation costs play a role in final good producers' fragmentation location decision.
The model also predicts the share of production that final good producers will fragment from a given location. The gains from fragmentation are decreasing in a location's wage relative to the producer's local wage and in transportation costs. Although I do not have the data to test the degree to which firms engage in domestic fragmentation, I use the linked census-import data to test the intensive margin of offshore fragmentation. As expected, I find that offshoring from a given location is decreasing in both the relative foreign wage and industry transportation costs.
The finding of a productivity premia for offshorers is consistent with results in previous papers. Kurz (2006) uses U.S. plant level data on foreign purchases of materials by manufacturing establishments in 1987 and 1992 and finds that offshorers are relatively more productive. The data in that paper, however, have no information about what materials were purchased, so the extent to which they represent commodity trade rather than fragmented production is indeterminable. Tomiura (2007) uses Japanese data on firms' sourcing decisions to create productivity rankings for each sourcing choice. These data identify production inputs, but have limited inclusion of within-firm fragmentation. 5 Additional micro studies of offshoring face similar data limitations. 6 The plant data I use improve upon previous measures of production fragmentation by covering domestic as well as foreign fragmentation, including integrated and outsourced sourcing, and specifying a degree of customization beyond what commodity and "off-the-shelf" purchases entail.
The empirical tests in the paper are most closely related to Hanson et al. (2005) . Those authors use multinational firm data to estimate affiliate demand for imported inputs as a function of industry and country characteristics. My paper builds upon that work because, in addition to estimating the intensive margin of imported inputs, I assess the determinants of firms' decision to fragment production at all, and conditional on fragmenting, whether to source at home or abroad. Consistent with Hillberry and Hummels (2008) who document a substantial contribution of the extensive margin to falling trade values over distance, I find a significant role for the extensive margin in firms' decision to fragment production.
The import data I use are also more comprehensive than the data in Hanson et al. (2005) .
Whereas the multinational data they use are only a subsample of the firms that fragment production, the new dataset I construct includes both integrated and outsourced production sourcing. This inclusion is important since, as noted in Feenstra (1998) , "looking within multinational firms alone does not give a full perspective on what is happening" (p. 36).
Although there is an extensive literature devoted to firms' ownership decisions in vertical production chains, the organization of physical production along these chains has been largely ignored. The literature generally assumes the different stages of production take place in different plants, without analyzing why and when fragmentation is optimal. This paper contributes to literature on the organization of production by assessing the costs and benefits associated with firms' decision to perform different stages of their production process in separate, distinct locations.
In the next section, I describe the new data and explain their relevance in current economic activity. In Section 3, I present new stylized facts about plants and firms that fragment their production and describe the main phenomena the model should capture. I develop the model in Section 4 and outline the main empirical predictions. I assess the model's 5 Although the data explicitly ask about outsourcing of production to separate firms, fragmentation of production within the firm is not addressed. Tomiura tries to correct the omission by identifying FDI at manufacturing affiliates, but this addition does not necessarily reflect vertical production fragmentation. In addition, his data include no measure of the within-firm domestic fragmentation margin. 6 Hijzen et al. (2010) and Görg et al. (2008) use micro-level offshoring data to present evidence that some offshoring firms enjoy positive productivity increases from the activity. Their data rely on measures that may include commodities or intermediates purchased in the marketplace. Their measure also excludes overseas processing or assembly in which final goods are imported back to the domestic country. predicted equilibrium relationships in Section 5 and conclude in Section 6.
Establishment-level fragmentation data
The data are based on a new question in the 2007 Census of Manufactures and Census of Wholesale. The question was designed to assess the prevalence of manufacturing and wholesale establishments that have some or all their manufacturing activities performed by another establishment. The censuses are surveys conducted in years that end in 2 and 7.
They cover the universe of wholesale and manufacturing establishments in the U.S., though data for single-unit manufacturing firms below an industry-specific cutoff size (usually 5 employees) are based on Federal income tax records. I address this limitation in Section 2.3 below.
The new production sourcing question is presented in Appendix A. It asks whether the establishment purchased contract manufacturing services from another establishment (within or outside its firm) to process materials or components that the establishment owns or controls; and if so, whether it primarily purchased these services domestically or abroad. The data in this paper provide a new and improved measure of production fragmentation.
First, they include a comprehensive domestic fragmentation measure. Second, they contain both outsourced and integrated production, unlike measures of foreign direct investment that consist only of the latter. Third, the data do not rely on imported intermediates as a measure of foreign fragmentation. Identifying intermediate trade often relies on inputoutput tables that are relatively coarse and therefore unlikely to identify intermediate inputs exclusively or entirely. 7 Imports of intermediates are also a limited measure since they exclude final goods that are assembled overseas and then imported or re-imported into the home country. In addition, not all goods and services that are offshored by a U.S. firm are imported back to the U.S. A firm may offshore production of goods that it sells in foreign markets. Finally, some imported inputs may not represent actual production fragmentation. Although commodities are often inputs into production, they are generally not considered offshoring. Homogeneous intermediate inputs, such as nuts and bolts, are often sold as final goods as well. It is unclear whether these intermediate goods sold in the marketplace represent fragmentation. While the degree of specificity needed to classify input trade as fragmentation is ambiguous, the data I use are not. My data represent a subset of production fragmentation in which some degree of customization exists.
At first glance, manufacturing production by wholesalers appears paradoxical. Traditional wholesalers simply distribute goods and have no involvement in the manufacturing process.
While the majority of wholesalers still function as distributors, the sector has evolved to include establishments that design, market and sell their own goods. Because these establishments perform little or no physical transformation activities, they are classified as wholesalers. 8 From an economic theory perspective, however, plants that design goods and coordinate their production are closer to manufacturers than distributors. As such, the wholesale sector contains plants whose behavior sheds light on manufacturing activity in the U.S. economy. 9
These data provide a rich new source for analyzing production fragmentation. By covering both domestic and foreign margins, they depict a more complete picture of firms' vertical production chains than the existing offshoring literature. The inclusion of wholesale plants expands our understanding of the way firms organize their production process. The linked import data provide information about the products and countries involved in fragmented production. They also allow for a comparison between all imports and those that represent fragmentation of customized production. An open question is how to think about the relationship between customized fragmentation and the purchase of standardized intermediate inputs. I plan to explore this issue more fully in future drafts. 8 The first industry to exhibit this organization of production was the semiconductor industry, with the emergence of "Fabless" companies. 9 The Census Bureau has recognized this issue and plans to address it in the 2012 Economic Census by identifying every manufacturing or wholesale establishment that does not perform its own manufacturing activities, but "undertakes all of the entrepreneurial steps and arranges for all required capital, labor, and material inputs required to make a good" (OMB (2010), pp. 3-4). These establishments will be classified in the manufacturing industry that corresponds to the good they sell, with an additional flag identifying them as factoryless goods producers (FGPs). The flag will distinguish FGPs from the traditional "integrated manufactures" (IMs) that perform their own transformation activities, and establishments whose main activity is to provide contract manufacturing services for others (referred to as manufacturing service providers or MSPs).
Aggregating to the firm-level
To assess firm-level sourcing decisions, I aggregate the plant data to the firm-level. 10 At the firm level, there are manufacturing firms, wholesale firms and "M & W" firms. The last category is for firms with both manufacturing and wholesale establishments. To aggregate the plant-level CMS data, I classify firms with at least one offshoring plant and no domestic fragmenters in "Offshore Purchases". Firms with at least one domestic fragmenting plant and no offshoring plants are classified in "Domestic Purchasers". Firms with at least one plant that purchases domestic CMS and at least one plant that purchases foreign CMS are classified in "Domestic and Offshore Purchases". Finally, firms that have no plants that purchase CMS, and have at least one plant that reported no purchases of CMS are designated to "No Purchases". to determine whether establishments belong to firms that import goods. 11 The LFTTD provides value, transaction type (whether the imports are intra-firm), country, and product information about firms' imports.
Additional establishment-level variables
I construct a value-added productivity measure for establishment i as vap i = va i /te i , where va denotes value-added and te denotes total employment. For manufacturing establishments, value-added is provided in the census. 12 For wholesalers, I calculate a proxy measure for value-added as va i = sales i − merch i , where merch i denotes the establishment's purchases of merchandise for resale. It may therefore be more appropriate to think of wholesaler productivity as a gross-margin, but call I it productivity for brevity. Establishment sales, employment, and productivity all vary significantly across industries. To make meaningful comparisons of these variables across establishments in different industries, I calculate a 10 The census data have a variable, firmid, that identifies the firm to which a given establishment belongs. This variable is superior to the employer identification number (EIN) used in other datasets to identify ownership. Since a single firm can use multiple EINs to file its tax returns, EINs may only identify part of a large firm.
11 It is not possible to link the trade transactions data to individual establishments for multi-unit firms. See Bernard et al. (2009) for a detailed description of the LFTTD. 12 In future drafts, I plan to calculate TFP for manufacturing plants.
relative measure x i,g /x g wherex g is the mean of variable x in the six digit NAICS industry g. I use the relative productivity measures to construct firm-level productivity. In Section 3, I also use these relative industry measures to compare establishment characteristics across CMS purchase types. It is not possible to analyze the subpopulation of plants that is never asked the CMS question. The smallest manufacturing establishments and wholesale plants in the 22 excluded industries are therefore outside the scope of this analysis. For plants within the potential sample that were not asked the CMS question or did not answer the question despite being asked, I investigate whether the data are missing at random. Appendix Table B .2 provides information on the plants outside the CMS sample. Plants in the sample do appear to be larger than the non-respondents. To correct for differences between the sample and the population of potential respondents, I estimate the probability that an observation is in the CMS sample. Following Cameron and Trivedi (2005) , I use the inverse probability as a weight in the empirical analyses. 14 Details of the missing data and weights estimation are in Appendix B.
Description of the CMS sample
13 Manufacturing has short and long forms, and only the long forms asked the CMS purchase questions. While all large and multi-unit firm establishments receive the long form, only a random sample of small, single-unit firms received the long form. Data for the smallest establishments is imputed from Federal tax returns and industry averages. 14 Cameron and Trivedi recommend using weights ("that are inversely proportional to the probability of inclusion in the sample") for a descriptive or data summary approach. They note that if a regression model is correctly specified then sample weighted and unweighted estimates should have the same probability limit, Cameron and Trivedi (2005) pp. 817-21.
New empirical facts
The census data provide new information about which plants and firms fragment their production. The data also highlight within industry patterns about producers' sourcing decisions. The linked firm-import data show the relationship between importing and offshoring and provide evidence on the foreign locations from which firms purchase CMS. This section presents the new information summarized in eight stylized facts that emerge from the data. Table 1 presents Columns 4-6 present the shares of plants, sales and employment within the CMS sample. In manufacturing, 27% of establishments fragment domestically, while 2% fragment offshore.
Establishment and firm-level patterns
Foreign fragmentation is twice as common in wholesale where almost 5% of establishments purchase CMS offshore, though only 12% do so domestically. The majority of establishments and firms do not purchase CMS, and of those that do, only a small fraction purchase them from another country. The finding of limited offshore sourcing for customized production is in line with results in Tomiura (2007) , where the author finds that only 2.68% of Japanese manufacturing firms outsource production offshore. Columns 5 and 6 provide the share of sales and employment respectively by plants' CMS purchase location, weighted by the inverse probability of being in the CMS sample. 15 For manufactures, the percent of sales and employment at plants that offshore doubles to 4%, while the percent of sales and employment at plants that fragment domestically jumps to 39% and 35% respectively. The pattern for wholesale plants is comparable, though much less dramatic. Although the higher sales and employment percentages reflect the fact that fragmenting plants are larger than non-fragmenters, they are still consistent with the plant participation patterns and lead to the following facts:
Fact 1: The majority of manufacturing and wholesale plants do not fragment their produc- 15 The weighted and unweighted shares are so similar that I only report the weighted shares. tion process, even on a sales or employment-weighted basis.
Fact 2: In the manufacturing sector, domestic fragmentation is approximately 10 times more prevalent than offshoring, while in the wholesale sector it is around 3 times more prevalent. Table 2 presents weighted means for establishment sales, employment and the log of valueadded labor productivity. Columns 1 and 2 show that the average plant that fragments production is larger in terms of both sales and employment than the average non-fragmenting plant. In addition, plants that fragment production offshore are larger than the domestic fragmenters. The average sales at manufacturing plant with no CMS purchases is approximately $19 million, while the average sales at a plant with offshore purchases is almost $50 million. Column 3 shows a similar pattern for value-added productivity. Domestic purchasers are more productive than plants with no fragmentation, while offshorers are the most productive. Columns 4-6 present averages by CMS purchase location for relative industry measures. As described in Section 2.2, the relative measures capture within industry heterogeneity and ensure that patterns across categories are not driven by compositional differences. The same patterns hold for the within-industry measures. In both manufacturing and wholesale, establishments with no purchases are smaller and less productive than establishments that purchase CMS domestically; and offshoring establishments are the largest and most productive plants. These results lead to two more stylized facts:
Fact 3: Manufacturing and wholesale plants that fragment production are larger and more productive than non-fragmenters.
Fact 4: Manufacturing and wholesale plants that fragment production offshore are larger and more productive than domestic fragmenters.
Although the majority of plants are single-unit firms, there is a substantial number of multi-unit firms. Column 1 in Table 3 shows the share of plants that belong to multi-unit firms within each CMS purchase location. 46% of manufacturers that offshore belong to multi-units, while 33% of the offshoring wholesale plants do. To assess whether firm-level participation shares are comparable to the plant-level patterns, I examine CMS purchases in the firm-level data. Table 4 provides summary statistics for firms' CMS purchases by sector. Participation shares for manufacturing and wholesale firms are almost identical to the establishmentlevel shares. For firms with both manufacturing and wholesale plants, the share of firms that purchase domestic CMS is 37%, while the share of firms that purchase CMS offshore is 5%. Despite the higher levels, firms with plants in both sectors exhibit the same production sourcing patterns as manufacturing and wholesale plants and firms. Columns 2-4 in Table 4 show the mean employment, sales and productivity by firm CMS purchase location. Firms that purchase CMS domestically are larger and more productive than non-purchasers, and offshorers are larger and more productive than domestic purchasers. While firms in the category "M & W" are substantially larger, they display the same basic patterns across CMS purchase type. The only exceptions are that domestic purchasers have more sales and are more productive than offshorers. The plant-level facts described above therefore apply to firms as well. 16
Industry distribution of CMS purchases
To explore establishment participation within industries, Table 5 presents the industry distribution of the share of establishments that purchase contract manufacturing services domestically and offshore. 17 The top panel is the distribution of the 86 four digit NAICS manufacturing industries. The first column shows that there are two industries in which no establishments offshore production. In one of these non-offshoring industries, 10-20% of the establishments purchase CMS domestically, in the other industry 20-35% of establishments do. The bottom panel presents the distribution for the 49 six digit NAICS wholesale industries. In the first column, there is only one industry with no offshoring establishments, and 5-10% of plants in that industry purchase domestic CMS.
The first striking observation from Table 5 is that every industry, in both manufacturing and wholesale, has a positive share of establishments that purchase domestic CMS. In manufacturing, at least 5% of the plants in every industry fragment at home. In wholesale, there are six industries with a share of domestic fragmenting plants greater than 0 and below 5%. This leads to the following fact:
Fact 5: Every industry has some establishments that fragment production domestically. Table 5 also shows substantial non-participation in every industry. In manufacturing, the highest possible share of fragmenting establishments is 60%, while in wholesale it is 35%.
This leads to a sixth fact:
Fact 6: Every industry has a substantial share of establishments that do not fragment their production at all. 16 I do not show relative industry measures since firms' often span multiple industries. Future drafts will estimate the probability of being in the sample for the firm-level data and include weighted employment and sales shares. 17 I do not repeat the industry analysis at the firm-level since many firms span multiple industries.
By examining the diagonal of Table 5 , it is evident that every manufacturing industry has a higher share of establishments that purchase domestic CMS relative to the share of plants that offshore. In contrast, wholesale has three industries with a higher share of offshoring establishments and ten industries with a potentially higher share. Closer examination reveals that a total of six wholesale industries have a higher share of offshoring plants. Despite these exceptions, domestic fragmentation is far more prevalent than offshoring. Only 6 of the total 135 industries have more offshoring plants relative to domestic fragmenting establishments.
Fact 7: More plants fragment production domestically than offshore in all manufacturing industries and in 88% of the wholesale industries.
Firm import patterns
Although the census questions do not ask about the degree or type of fragmentation in which plants engage, the linked census-import data provide information about the products and countries from which every firm imports. Column 1 in Table 6 shows the share of firms that import within each CMS purchase location. The first striking feature is that there is a positive share of importing firms across all categories. Of the firms that do not purchase CMS, 41% of manufacturing firms and 36% of wholesale firms import goods.
These shares are higher than the average for the full manufacturing and wholesale samples and, consistent with the employment and sales premia discussed in Section 2.3, suggest a selection effect into the CMS sample. They also highlight a potential limitation of relying solely on import data to identify fragmented production. Firms that do NOT purchase any contract manufacturing services import goods. These imports may reflect commodity trade or purchases of materials and components sold in the marketplace.
The share of domestic CMS purchasers that import is somewhat higher, with 52% of manufacturing and 43% of wholesale firms importing goods. As expected, firms that offshore have a higher share of importing firms. 89% of manufacturing firms and 84% of wholesale firms that purchase CMS offshore import goods. Although these shares are high, they are not equal to one. 18 The finding that firms that purchase CMS offshore do not always import goods reflects another limitation of relying on import data alone to identify offshoring.
Firms may offshore production of goods that they sell overseas and never import to their home country. Table 6 also provides information about the number of countries from which firms import goods. Columns 2 and 3 present the median and mean number of origin countries for all firms, while Columns 4 and 5 provide the same statistics for the subsample of importing firms. These columns show that, on average, an offshoring firm imports goods from more countries than its domestic and non-CMS purchasing counterparts. In addition, firms with establishments that purchase CMS domestically and offshore have the highest average number of countries from which they import goods. Table 6 has an important message about firms' sourcing locations. The average number of countries from which an offshoring firm imports goods is greater than one and greater than the average for non-offshorers. This leads to the following fact:
Fact 8: Firms that purchase CMS offshore tend to import goods from multiple countries.
Model of Production Fragmentation
In this section, I develop a static partial equilibrium model for firms' production fragmentation decisions. The model captures the stylized facts presented in the previous section and provides a framework to assess the costs and benefits associated with fragmenting production across different locations.
Demand
Consumers are identical with preferences for differentiated varieties i in sector j given by
where ε = 1 1−σ , > 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution between goods in a given sector. Consumers spend an exogenous share of income, λ j , on each sector so I drop j subscripts for simplicity. They will be useful later when taking the model to the data. These CES preferences lead to demand for a particular variety i in a given sector,
where A = λE P , E is aggregate expenditure, and P is the price index.
Production
Final good producers are located in their home state, H. In the static model, producers'
location is exogenous to their sourcing arrangement. In the long-run, however, producers' location may depend upon their anticipated sourcing strategy. When I assess the empirical implications of the model, I consider the possibility that producers choose their location based on their production sourcing strategy and propose two potential approaches to mitigate the bias this location selection may cause.
Labor is the only factor of production and is supplied inelastically. 
In this framework, the most productive producers are also the biggest producers. Holding demand constant, states with lower wages also have larger producers. 19 The single input is based on the set-up in Rodríguez-Clare (2010) 20 See for example Melitz (2003) and Bernard et al. (2003) .
Model with production fragmentation
Final good producers can now purchase tasks from manufacturing service providers (MSPs).
MSPs specialize in the production of a single task they customize for multiple producers. By specializing, the MSP is more efficient at the production of a given task than an integrated plant. This assumption is consistent with anecdotal evidence I collected at a contract manufacturing trade show. MSPs have the capital equipment, labor force, and expertise to make their product very efficiently and customize each order to meet individual buyers' specifications. I spoke to various MSPs and CMS purchasers who explained that MSPs enjoy lower production costs due to specialization in one type of component. 
Benefits from fragmentation
δ H,s denotes the distance between the final good producer in state H and the sourcing location s. Transportation costs are increasing in distance so that ∂τ ∂δ > 0. ω k represents an inherent characteristic, such of as weight, of the output from task k. ∂τ ∂ω > 0 reflects task-specific differences in fragmentation costs attributable to these inherent differences. ρ k represents the complexity and ensuing communication requirements of task k. A number of the recent theoretical papers on offshoring focus on the role of problem-solving requirements in increasing communication costs associated with offshore production. 22 In these models, production requires solving problems that vary in difficulty. When workers cannot solve a problem, they must ask a firm manager located in the final good plant for an answer. As a result, industries with more difficult problems entail greater communication costs so that ∂τ ∂ρ > 0. Finally, marginal costs depend upon η H , the current state of information technology available to the final good producer. If the assertions in the literature are correct, then fragmentation costs are decreasing in the state of technology and ∂τ ∂η < 0. In addition, ∂ 2 τ ∂ρ ∂η , the cross-partial with respect to complexity and technology, will be negative. Improvements in technology will decrease fragmentation costs more for communication-intensive tasks.
Assuming iceberg-type marginal costs, the per-unit cost to a final good producer in region s, for task k purchased from an MSP in location s is: Figure 1 illustrates the trade off producers face between labor costs and fragmentation costs.
To remain on the same isocost curve, a higher fragmentation cost must be offset by a lower wage or higher gain from specialization.
Choosing the optimal sourcing strategy
Final good producers can now manufacture their product within an integrated plant, or they can fragment their production process across multiple plants. If they fragment, producers choose between sourcing tasks from their home state, H, another domestic state, D, offshore, O, or some combination of these locations. To determine which sourcing strategy maximizes total profits, producers first maximize variable profits for each strategy. They then compare total profits across strategies by subtracting the respective fixed costs associated with fragmentation to a given location.
To maximize variable profits for a given sourcing strategy, producers choose the optimal location available for that strategy for each task. The optimal location for each task is simply the location with the lowest cost: c * k,H = min{c k,H,s }. For task k, fragmenting from s is cheaper than integrated production if
, where s ∈ {H, D, O}.
When a producer assesses the mixed strategy of sourcing from another domestic state and from a foreign location, he must also compare those relative costs and benefits. The optimal location for a given task is offshore when
For a given producer in state H considering the optimal location of task k, equation 3
suggests that the distance between H and the potential sourcing locations will affect these relative costs. This leads to the following testable prediction:
Empirical prediction 1: Conditional on fragmentation, producers are more likely to fragment tasks offshore if they are closer to the foreign sourcing destination.
Determining the share of fragmentation from a given location
A final good producer that has chosen to purchase CMS from a given location will fragment tasks until the marginal cost of doing so is equal to the marginal benefit. Without loss of generality, order tasks such that ∂τ ∂k > 0 for a given location. Under this assumption, a final good producer in state H will purchase a share of tasksk s from location s, wherek s is implicitly defined by:
Figure 2 depicts this relationship. It shows that the share of tasks fragmented from a given location is decreasing in the relative foreign wage, w s /w H . This leads to the following testable prediction:
Empirical prediction 2: Conditional on purchasing tasks from a given location s, the share of tasks purchased will be decreasing in that location's relative wage.
Figure 2 also shows that a decrease in fragmentation costs will result in a higher share of tasks being sourced from location s. This leads to an additional testable prediction:
Empirical prediction 3: Conditional on purchasing tasks from a given location s, the share of tasks purchased will be decreasing in the task-specific fragmentation costs.
When the producer fragments production to a single location s, the cost of the common input M is then:
More generally, the producer may fragment production in multiple locations. In this case, the share of tasks fragmented to location s will depend not just on the cutoff condition in equation 7, but also on the relative wages and costs as presented in equation 6. The cost of M with fragmentation in multiple locations is then:
where S can be any combination of sourcing strategies andk si denotes share of tasks sourced from location si ∈ H, D, O. The total share of fragmented production is simplyk = k si .
Maximizing total profits
Once final good producers have determined the maximum variable profits for each sourcing strategy, it is straightforward to maximize total profits. Producers subtract the fixed costs associated with the respective locations and choose the strategy with the highest profits.
Profits for each strategy are given by:
where C S is given by equation 9. Figure 3 plots optimal profits for integrated production, domestic fragmentation and offshore fragmentation as a function of productivity. Since
C O < C D < C I , π O is steeper than π D which is steeper than π I . The fixed costs associated with each strategy, however, mean that only plants above the productivity threshold ϕ ε−1 D will find it optimal to fragment domestically, while those above ϕ ε−1 O will find it optimal to offshore. 23 Although not depicted in Figure 3 , profits from a mixed strategy of domestic and offshore sourcing would be steeper than π O but would result in the highest productivity threshold due to the combination of fixed costs incurred from sourcing in multiple locations.
This productivity sorting leads to two testable predictions:
Empirical prediction 4: Firms with productivity above a threshold ϕ ε−1 D will fragment production domestically.
23 Future drafts will include a specific expression for these thresholds.
Empirical prediction 5: Firms with productivity above a threshold ϕ ε−1 O > ϕ ε−1 D will offshore production.
Profits and changes in the producer's home wage
In this section, I derive the effect of changes in the producers' home state wage on the benefits from fragmentation relative to integrated production. Consider the effect of a change in the producer's home state wage, w H . Profits from integrated production will change according to:
Integrated profits are decreasing in the wage (recall that (1 − ε) < 0), but at a decreasing rate as w H increases. The change in profits from fragmented production in location s is given by:
The term (1 −k) in equation 12 reflects the fact that an increase in the home wage only raises marginal costs for the share of production done at home. The additional terms in the parentheses capture the effect of an increase in the home wage on the share of fragmented production. From equation 7, the terms in the square brackets are zero, reflecting the fact that the change in the share of fragmented production has no net effect on profits. This occurs because plants fragment until the marginal benefit from fragmentation is equal to its marginal cost.
Combining equations 11 and 12, the effect of an increase in the home wage on integrated profits relative to fragmented profits is
As long as fixed costs are small relative to total revenue, 24 then equation 13 simplifies to
For a plant that is indifferent between integrated and fragmented production, w H ≥ C s .
In this region, the slope of π I is therefore steeper than the slope of π D so that an increase in a producer's home wage means that fragmented production will become more profitable relative to integrated production. This leads to the following prediction.
Empirical prediction 6: All else equal, plants located in high wage states will be more likely to fragment production.
Profits and changes in the producer's technology
This section analyzes the impact of changes in a producer's technology on profits from fragmented technology. While π I is independent of a plant's technology, the change in fragmentation profits from an increase in technology ρ is:
where the change in costs with respect to technology is given by
The terms in square brackets in equation 15 are equal to zero from equation 7. The second term represents the fall in fragmentation costs from improved technology. Plugging 15
into equation 14 shows that if the assumption of ∂τ (k) ∂η < 0 is correct, then an increase in communication technology will lead to an increase in profits for plants with fragmented production. This leads to a final prediction. Empirical prediction 7: All else equal, plants with better communication technology will be more likely to fragment production.
then when πI = πF , integrated profits decrease more rapidly than fragmented profits in response to an increase in the home wage. This condition reflects the fact that fixed costs are paid in the home wage. If fixed costs are greater than this threshold, they will swamp any marginal cost benefit from fragmentation.
Assessment of the model's equilibrium relationships
In this section, I use the census data to assess the equilibrium relationships predicted by the model. First I use plant-level data to estimate the probability that a producer will fragment its production. I also estimate the probability of fragmenting production offshore, conditional on purchasing CMS. In both cases, I address the possibility of reverse causality between plants' sourcing choices and their productivity and technology. I then use the firmlevel data to ensure that estimates for firms are comparable to the establishment results.
Finally, I test the model's predictions about the degree of fragmentation from a given location using firm import data.
The fragmentation decision
The model makes a number of predictions about which final good producers will fragment their production. I assess these predictions by estimating the probability that an establishment purchases contract manufacturing services (CMS). Because fragmentation incurs a fixed cost, the probability should be increasing in plant-level productivity. In contrast, plants with higher fragmentation costs are less likely to purchase CMS. In the model, fragmentation costs depend on information technology, task and location specific transportation costs, and task-specific communication costs. Finally, the model predicts that labor costs affect final good producers' fragmentation motives. Plants located in relatively high wage states are therefore more likely to fragment production in order to access cheaper labor.
To capture cross-sectional differences in information technology, I identify establishments that use electronic networks (Enets) to coordinate the flow of their shipments. In manufacturing, the share of establishments using these networks is about 36% for non-fragmenters, 51% for domestic fragmenters, and 62% for offshorers. In contrast, the percentage of establishments using electronic networks in wholesale is relatively constant at about 23%. 
where y i,f,h,s equals one if plant i, in firm f , industry j and state h purchases CMS. P rod denotes productivity quintiles, wage i,H is the producer's home state wage described above,
and Enets is a dummy for whether the plant uses electronic networks to coordinate its shipments. I also include a full set of six digit NAICS industry dummies as controls.
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 7 report the coefficients from an OLS estimation of equation 16 for manufacturing and wholesale plants respectively. These regressions are weighted by the inverse probability that an observation is in the sample to correct for possible selection bias. 25 As predicted, the probability that an establishment fragments production is increasing in its productivity. Manufacturing establishments in the top productivity quintile are 8.4 percentage points more likely to purchase CMS than the least productive establishments. For wholesalers, the most productive plants are seven percentage points more likely to purchase CMS. Consistent with the model, the probability that an establishment purchases CMS is also increasing in its state wage. A doubling of the state wage increases the probability that an establishment will fragment its production by 9.6 percentage points for manufacturers and 6.2 points for wholesalers. For manufacturers, the estimated effect of electronic networks is also consistent with the model. Manufacturing plants that use electronic networks to coordinate their shipments are 10.6 percentage points more likely to fragment their production. To my knowledge, this is the first direct empirical evidence on the relationship between information technology and producers' sourcing decisions. It also suggests that η, the measure of information technology in equation 3, is of economic importance. The effect of electronic networks for wholesalers is also positive, though the estimated coefficient is quite small and only marginally statistically significant. 26
Addressing endogenous productivity and electronic networks
While the model predicts that final good producers must exceed an endogenous productivity threshold in order to fragment production, it also shows that fragmentation leads to productivity gains. Final good producers purchase CMS to decrease their marginal production costs, and this cost decrease may result in higher measured revenue productivity.
To address potential reverse causality between an establishment's productivity and its fragmentation status, I instrument for productivity in 2007 using the plant's 2002 productivity.
In the model, fragmentation status depends not only productivity, but also on time-varying 25 The weighted and unweighted estimates are almost identical. Future drafts will include a Hausman test of any potential differences between the two specifications. 26 The model assumes that producers' location is exogenous. I plan to do robustness checks in which I limit the sample to older plants to address possible endogeneity of location. I am also considering limiting the sample to products that must be sold in local markets, since producers will have to co-locate with demand and therefore cannot base their locational choices on the fragmentation costs and benefits proposed by the model. The instrument for each first stage regression is always significant, with the expected positive coefficient. Each column in Table D .1 also reports the F-Statistic for the null hypothesis that the instruments are jointly equal to zero. All of these statistics are well-above the threshold of 10 proposed in Stock et al. (2002) .
The IV sample is limited to establishments that existed in 2002 and for whom I have electronic use data in 2002. Because the IV sample is considerably smaller, columns 3 and 4 in Table 7 report OLS estimates of the probability that a plant will fragment production on the IV sample. 27 The OLS coefficients from the IV sample are comparable to estimates from the full sample. The estimated IV coefficients reported in columns 5 and 6, however, are noticeably different. While the OLS estimates depict a linear relationship between manufacturing plants' productivity and fragmentation choice, the IV results suggest that only establishments in the top 3 productivity quintiles have a higher probability of purchasing CMS. In addition, the IV estimate for the most productive quintile is 0.24, twice as large as the OLS estimates. The wholesale plants display a similar pattern. Only plants in the top productivity quintile are more likely to fragment, and the probability that they will do so is 9.4 percentage points higher than the least productive plants' probability of purchasing CMS. For manufactures, the IV estimate of the electronic networks variable is larger than the OLS estimates. Manufacturing plants that use electronic networks are almost 18 percentage points more likely to fragment their production. This result suggests that plant-level information technology plays a significant role in producers' optimal sourcing strategies. Table 10 reports results from estimating the probability that an establishment that purchases CMS will do so offshore. The regressions in Table 10 are therefore based on data that include only the establishments that purchase CMS. Consistent with the theory, the estimated coefficients suggest the most productive establishments have a higher probability of purchasing CMS offshore. The IV estimates, however, are less conclusive. Although the IV estimates for being in the top productivity quintile are larger than the OLS estimates, their statistical significance is marginal. For manufacturers the estimate is no longer significant, and for wholesalers it is significant only at the ten percent level. In the full sample, the state wage is not a significant predictor plants' offshoring decision. This result is also consistent with the model. Once a final good producer has chosen to fragment its production, the locational choice depends upon the relative wages at the different CMS purchase locations, not on its own wage. The wage is significant in the IV regressions, but this seems to be due to sample selection and is therefore difficult to interpret. The electronic network variable is statistically significant for manufacturers, though it is smaller than it was for the fragmentation decision. As it is for the fragmentation decision, the IV estimate for use of electronic networks is substantially larger than the OLS estimates. Manufacturing plants that use electronic networks are 9.8 percentage points more likely to offshore their fragmented production. points more likely to offshore, while those on a coastline are 1 percentage point more likely to offshore. Wholesalers bordering Mexico are about 3 percentage points more likely to fragment, and those on a coastline are almost 6 percentage points more likely to offshore.
The offshoring decision
Since being in one of these border states decreases the distance between a plant and potential foreign sourcing locations, these results support the model's prediction that transportation costs depend on plants' relative location and are an important determinant of final good producers' sourcing location decision. 28
Firm-level evidence on fragmentation decisions
I also estimate equation 16 via OLS using the firm-level data. Table 11 reports the results which are generally consistent with the plant-level estimates. The probability that a firm will fragment its production is increasing in its productivity, use of electronic networks, and state wage. Table 12 reports results from an OLS estimation of the probability that a firm purchasing CMS will do so offshore. These results are also consistent with the plant-level estimates, although the use of electronic networks has a negative effect for wholesalers. 29
The degree of fragmentation for a given location
The model's predictions 1 and 2 state that for a given location, the share of tasks that the final producer fragments will be decreasing in the location's relative wage and the taskspecific transportation costs. Although I have no information about the extent or location of firms' domestic CMS purchases, I do have country and product information about firms' imports. I use these import data as a proxy measure ofk s , the degree of fragmentation from a given location, s. Table 6 shows that firms with all types of sourcing strategies import goods. Since this paper focuses on fragmentation of a plant's individual production process, it is important to distinguish between imports that contain output from production fragmentation and other types of imports. I pool imports by non-CMS purchasing firms and imports by firms that purchase CMS offshore, and identify customized fragmentation with an offshore indicator for the CMS purchasing firms. I interact the offshore indicator with the relevant cost and benefit variables to estimate elasticities for offshored production. The model's predictions are conditional on fragmentation to a given location, so the sample includes only positive 28 In future drafts, I plan to use the distance between an establishment and a deep sea port and an international airport as more precise measures of foreign transportation costs.
29 These results are all subject to the reverse causality problem discussed in the previous section. I plan to do IV estimates for these regressions to ensure that the IV results continue to hold at the firm-level. import values. The estimating equation is:
where ival f,j,h,c is value of imports by firm f , whose primary employment is in industry j. l denotes the imported goods' industry and s denotes imports' country of origin. Of f shorer is an indicator for whether a firm purchases CMS from overseas. I interact productivity, electronic networks, wages and transportation costs with the offshore indicator to assess whether customized fragmentation is more sensitive to these variables. β JO is a full set of industry dummies that control for the firm's primary industry, and industry dummies interacted with the offshore dummy. I also estimate equation 17 using ln(ival f,j,l,s /sales f ) as a dependent variable, and excluding sales from the set of regressors. Since this ratio is closer to the ideal measure of offshored tasks over total tasks, it is the preferred specification.
I obtain industry-country level wages from the International Labor Organization (ILO).
I construct a relative foreign wage for each country and industry as w s,j /w us,j , where s denotes the foreign country and j represents the industry. I also construct an industry-level measure of transportation costs using the import transactions database. Additional details about the variables' construction are provided in the Appendix C. Table 13 reports the results of estimating equation 17 via OLS on the pooled sample of imports by non-CMS purchasers and offshoring firms. Imports and imports over sales are both decreasing in the country-industry relative wage and industry transportation costs for all firms. As expected, the interaction of the relative wage with the offshore dummy is negative and significant in three of the four regressions. CMS purchasing firms are more responsive to wage differences than their non-fragmenting counterparts. The interaction between offshore status and transportation costs is negative and significant in all regressions.
This suggests that the elasticity of imports with respect to trade costs is higher for firms with customized fragmentation. The interaction between electronic networks and the offshoring indicator is positive, consistent with the hypothesis that information technology decreases fragmentation costs. Finally, the interaction between firm productivity and offshore status is small and statistically insignificant. This result is consistent with the model which predicts no role for productivity in the degree of final good producers' fragmentation.
Conclusion
This paper uses plant-level data to establish novel facts about firms' decisions to fragment customized production processes across plants. Because the data refer to purchases of contract manufacturing services for which some degree of customization exists, the type of fragmentation considered here is more complex than trade in intermediate goods that may be purchased in the marketplace. As such, it is also much closer to the type of fragmentation on which the theoretical trade literature has focused. Despite the attention that offshore production has received, I find that only a small percentage of firms fragment their production offshore. Domestic fragmentation is far more prevalent than offshoring, especially among manufacturing firms. The paper also documents substantial within industry heterogeneity in firms' fragmentation decisions. Every industry has a large share of firms that do not fragment production at all; and firms that fragment production are larger and more productive than non-fragmenting plants, even within six digit NAICS industries. Of the firms that fragment production, those that do so offshore are the largest and most productive.
These findings are consistent with a framework in which fragmentation incurs both fixed and marginal costs. I propose a model in which transportation and communication requirements for fragmented tasks affect marginal costs. Additional empirical tests are consistent with the importance of both these costs in firms' fragmentation decisions. By comparing import elasticities for firms that purchase contract manufacturing services offshore to those that do not, I also find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that production of customized inputs is more sensitive to the costs and benefits incurred from fragmentation.
A plant's ability to fragment a customized portion of its production process has significant implications for how we think about the production function. A typical production function includes skilled and unskilled labor, capital and materials. This paper suggests these standard assumptions about plants' utilization of labor may no longer be valid. Plants may be geographically differentiated and as result have arbitrage opportunities to purchase labor from other locations.
Appendices A Contract Manufacturing Question
The CMS purchase question is the third part of the special inquiries section, question 26 on the Census of Manufacturers and Census of Wholesalers. The exact question is:
"Did this establishment purchase contract manufacturing services from other companies or other establishments of your company to process materials or components that this establishment owns or controls?"
The question has 3 boxes that respondents could check:
1. Yes, primarily with establishments WITHIN the 50 states and the District of Columbia.
2. Yes, primarily with establishments OUTSIDE the 50 states and the District of Columbia.
No.

B Missing Data
There are 71 NAICS wholesale industries, but the CMS question was only asked in 49 industries. All establishments originally classified in these 49 industries were sent a census form that asked the CMS purchase question. Table B .1 provides a list of the 22 NAICS wholesale industries that were not asked the CMS question. All establishments that were originally classified in one of these excluded industries were not asked the CMS question.
As a result, any establishment that was reclassified from an excluded industry into one of the 49 included industries was not asked the question.
There are approximately 11,000 wholesale establishments that were asked the CMS question despite being in an industry that was not asked the question. These establishments were reclassified from an industry that was asked the question to one that was not. Since the within industry sample of these establishments is quite small, and reclassified establishments likely differ from their industry counterparts in systematic ways, I exclude them from the analysis in the paper. One option is to assess whether the additional information may provide a better measure of electronic network use in 2007.
The section "E-COMMERCE SALES, SHIPMENTS, RECEIPTS, OR REVENUE" asks: This suggestions an important role for the substitutability of labor in a given location, for a given industry. I have yet to address this dimension of variation.
C.3 Foreign Wages
The foreign wage data are from the International Labor Organization. I use wages from 2003 because it is the most recent year of complete data. I construct relative foreign wages for each occupation as w * /w U S , where w * denotes the wage in a foreign country. I select wages for the least skilled occupations, such as assembler and laborer, within an ILO industry since these occupations are more likely to be relevant for the fragmentation decision. I match the ILO data to NAICS industries by hand to obtain a relative foreign wage in a given NAICS industry. The industries vary from three digit to six digit NAICS.
C.4 Transportation Costs
I construct industry-level transportation costs from the import transactions database. For each transaction, the transportation cost is the freight charges divided by the total value of the imports. I concord the HS-product codes to NAICS industries using the concordance from Pierce and Schott (2009) . I aggregate to the industry level by taking the simple average of the transportation cost over all the HS-product, country, firm transactions within an industry. In the future, I will use weights and assess the potential for constructing measures that depend on how goods were transported (air, vessel, freight). These additional measures will allow for a richer exploration of the role that transportation costs play in firms' sourcing decisions. Standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance respectively. † Regressions weighted by the probability that an observation is missing. Standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance respectively. † Regressions weighted by the probability that an observation is missing. 0.055*** 0.027*** 0.050 (0.007) (0.004) (0.040) Q4 0.076*** 0.042*** 0.081** (0.007) (0.004) (0.039) Q5 0.092*** 0.073*** 0.106*** (0.007) (0.004) (0.039) ln(state wage) 0.015*** 0.005*** 0.027*** (0.002) (0.001) (0.009) Multi-unit firm 0.045*** -0.018*** (0.008) (0.005) Other sector plants 0.019* 0.007 0.112*** (0.010) (0.008) (0.016) Industry Controls yes yes yes AR-Squared 0.07 0.04 0.11 N 70,900 84,600 4,100
Tables
Standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance. † Firms with both manufacturing and wholesale establishments. Manufactures Productivity Q2 0.118*** 0.058*** -0.002 -0.007** 0.045*** (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) Q3
-0.010 0.174*** 0.080*** 0.004 0.072*** (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.007) Q4 -0.132*** 0.075*** 0.254*** 0.069*** 0.085*** (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) Q5 -0.158*** -0.053*** 0.121*** 0.371*** 0.099*** (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) Electronic Networks -0.018*** -0.004 0.013*** 0.022*** 0.265*** (0.004) (0 Wholesale Productivity Q2 0.089*** 0.073*** 0.056*** 0.025*** 0.040*** (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) Q3
-0.007 0.166*** 0.137*** 0.055*** 0.058*** (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) Q4 -0.114*** 0.081*** 0.270*** 0.157*** 0.068*** (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) Q5 -0.169*** -0.034*** 0.158*** 0.462*** 0.046*** (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.013) Electronic Networks -0.016*** -0.001 0.037*** 0.017** 0.361*** (0.005) (0 Notes: Each column reports the coefficients and standard errors for the excluded instruments in the first stage regression of the respective endogenous variable. Instruments are 2002 lagged values. The F-Statistic is for a test of the null hypothesis that the instruments are jointly equal to zero. Standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance. Notes: Each column reports the coefficients and standard errors for the excluded instruments in the first stage regression of the respective endogenous variable. Instruments are 2002 lagged values. The F-Statistic is for a test of the null hypothesis that the instruments are jointly equal to zero. Standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance.
